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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.   
 Plaintiff DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. (“DLJ”) brought a 
debt and foreclosure action against Roy Sheridan (“Sheridan” 
or “Roy Sheridan”), Ana Sheridan, and the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS” or the “Government”).  The parties proceeded 
to a bench trial.  At the close of DLJ’s case-in-chief, the District 
Court granted judgment in favor of DLJ under Rule 52(c) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding that DLJ 
satisfied all elements of its debt and foreclosure claim.  On 
appeal, Roy Sheridan, the only Appellant, complains that he 
was not heard prior to judgment. 
 
 We must decide whether the District Court properly 
granted judgment immediately after DLJ’s case-in-chief.  
3 
 
Because we find that, under the circumstances of this case, Roy 
Sheridan was “fully heard” prior to judgment, and that his 
remaining challenges are meritless, we will affirm the 






In August 2007, Ana and Roy Sheridan executed a 
promissory note in favor of FirstBank of Puerto Rico 
(“FirstBank”) in the amount of $725,000 (the “Note”).  The 
Sheridans also executed a mortgage granting FirstBank a first 
priority security interest in two real estate properties as security 
for the Note (the “Mortgage”).  Under the terms of the Note, 
the Sheridans were jointly and severally liable for the full 
amount of the loan.  The Note further provided that FirstBank 
“may transfer this Note” and “[FirstBank] or anyone who takes 
this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments 
under this Note is called the ‘Note Holder.’”1  
  
In 2009 and 2011, the Sheridans and FirstBank agreed 
to modify the Note and Mortgage by, among other things, 
increasing the principal sum and extending the maturity date of 
the loan.  Both modifications to the Mortgage stated that, 
except as amended, the original terms of the Mortgage 
remained in effect.2  The 2009 amendment to the Note also 
 
1 App. 488. 
2 The 2009 Mortgage Modification specifically states that “[i]n 
all other respects, the mortgage shall remain unchanged and 
shall remain in full force and effect.”  App. 518 (emphasis 
omitted).  The 2011 Mortgage Modification similarly states 
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contained similar language reinforcing the unaffected terms of 
the original Note. 
 
In 2012, the Sheridans defaulted under the terms of 
the Note by failing to make several monthly payments.  A year 
later, FirstBank assigned the Mortgage to DLJ (the 
“Assignment”).  FirstBank also transferred physical possession 
of the Note to DLJ.  
  
In 2015, DLJ, through its loan servicer, Select 
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”), sent the Sheridans a Notice 
of Default-Right to Cure.  The Notice of Default provided the 
Sheridans with the amount still owing under the Note and a 





In October 2016, DLJ commenced a debt and 
foreclosure action against the Sheridans and the IRS.  The IRS 
was a named defendant to the action because of its federal tax 
lien, in the amount of $18,924, against Roy Sheridan and 
recorded against the properties used to secure the Note.3  
 
that “[e]xcept as expressly set forth in and modified by this 
Agreement, the terms and conditions of the Note, Mortgage, 
Assignment of Leases and Rents and the Loan Documents, as 
amended, remain unchanged and shall remain in full force and 
effect according to the original terms and tenor thereof.”  App. 
521 (emphasis omitted).  
3 Under Virgin Islands law, “[a]ny person having a lien 
subsequent to the plaintiff upon the same property or any part 




The Sheridans and the IRS answered the complaint.  
The Sheridans asserted ten affirmative defenses, which, as 
relevant on appeal, did not include any allegation of fraud.  The 
parties then proceeded to discovery.  Under the District Court’s 
Trial Management Order, discovery requests and production 
were to be completed by September 2017.  Although DLJ 
complied with its discovery obligations, the Sheridans failed to 
participate in discovery. 
 
Before trial, the parties attempted mediation.  Over the 
course of several months, the parties participated in at least 
three mediation sessions presided over by the Magistrate 
Judge.  Unfortunately, the parties were unable to reach a 
settlement.  DLJ and the IRS did, however, execute a consent 
to judgment of foreclosure where the IRS conceded that its tax 
lien was subordinate to DLJ’s first priority security interest in 
the properties.4 
One week prior to trial, Roy Sheridan5 filed witness 
and exhibit lists identifying a non-party witness from 
FirstBank and documents that were not disclosed or provided 
during discovery.  Upon DLJ’s motion to exclude evidence not 
 
obligation for the payment of the debt or any part thereof, 
secured by the mortgage or other lien which is the subject of 
the action, shall be made a defendant in the action.  Any person 
having a prior lien may be made defendant at the option of the 
plaintiff, or by the order of the court when deemed necessary.”  
28 V.I.C. § 532. 
4 Although the IRS moved to be excluded from trial, the 
Government was ultimately present at trial. 
5 At trial, Roy and Ana Sheridan, then divorced, were 
represented by separate counsel. 
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previously disclosed, the Magistrate Judge ordered that “the 
documents and witnesses not previously disclosed, with the 
exception of the Sheridans themselves, be excluded from 
trial.”6  In addition, the night before trial, Roy Sheridan moved 
for leave to file a “Joint First Amended Answer” to include 
allegations of fraud and violations of the Truth in Lending 
Act.7   
 
The next day, the parties proceeded to a one-day 
bench trial.  The District Court heard from DLJ’s fact-witness, 
Linda Holmes, who is an employee of SPS, and Roy Sheridan.  
At the conclusion of its case-in-chief, DLJ moved for a 
“directed verdict.”8  The District Court heard from all parties 
as to the elements of the debt and foreclosure claims.  In 
response to DLJ’s request for a directed verdict, Roy Sheridan 
argued that DLJ lacked standing to enforce the Note and 
Mortgage and that, therefore, the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction over the case.  Ana Sheridan, who moved for 
judgment as a matter of law, made similar arguments 
contesting DLJ’s standing to enforce the Note and Mortgage.9   
 
 
6 App. 417. 
7 App. 466.  The District Court did not explicitly rule on the 
motion. 
8 App. 272-73.  Because the parties proceeded with a bench 
trial, and consistent with DLJ’s arguments on appeal, we 
construe DLJ’s motion as a Rule 52(c) motion for judgment on 
partial findings, rather than as a motion for a directed verdict.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c). 
9 Notably, though, Ana Sheridan conceded that there was 
evidence that there was a mortgage and a note, and that there 
was a breach of the mortgage and the note.  App. 288-89. 
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Upon hearing from the parties, the District Court 
made several findings and concluded that DLJ’s evidence was 
sufficient to prove the elements of its debt and foreclosure 
claim, including that DLJ had standing to enforce the Note and 
Mortgage.  Although Roy Sheridan reminded the District Court 
that it had not ruled on whether he would be “able to present 
his affirmative defenses concerning fraud,” no party 
challenged the judgment at that time as premature.10  On 
August 10, 2018, the District Court filed its written Judgment, 
providing its factual findings, conclusions of law, and several 
orders granting relief.   
 
Thirty-one days later, Roy Sheridan moved for a new 
trial or for reconsideration of the judgment, arguing that the 
District Court erred in entering judgment without the parties 
attempting to mediate in good faith and that the Judgment was 
void because it deprived him of property without the 
opportunity to be heard.11 
 
On October 1, 2018, Roy Sheridan filed a notice of 
appeal.12   
II13 
 
DLJ contests our jurisdiction, arguing that Sheridan’s 
notice of appeal was untimely.  “We have jurisdiction to review 
 
10 App. 314. 
11 The District Court has not ruled on the post-trial motion. 
12 Ana Sheridan and the IRS are not participating in this appeal. 
13 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(1) and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a).  
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our own jurisdiction” and find that we can appropriately 
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 1294(3).14 
   
 DLJ argues that we lack jurisdiction over Sheridan’s 
appeal because Sheridan did not file the appeal within thirty 
days of the District Court’s written Judgment dated August 10, 
2018.  Sheridan responds that the appeal is timely because the 
IRS’s involvement in the proceedings triggered the 60-day 
period for filing a notice of appeal under Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) 4(a)(1)(B)(ii).  We need not 
decide whether the IRS’s involvement in the proceedings 
triggered application of the 60-day deadline, because the 
District Court’s failure to comply with the separate-order 
requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 58 
renders this appeal timely. 
 
 “Under [FRAP] 4(a)(1)(A), notices of appeal must 
generally be filed ‘within 30 days after the . . . order appealed 
from is entered.’”15  However, where FRCP 58(a)(1) “‘requires 
a separate document,’ the judgment is considered entered 
‘when the judgment or order is entered in the civil docket under 
[FRCP] 79(a) and when the earlier of these events occurs: [1] 
the judgment or order is set forth on a separate document, or 
 
14 LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 
222 (3d Cir. 2007). 
15 Id. at 223 (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A)). 
9 
 
[2] 150 days have run from entry of the judgment or order in 
the civil docket under [FRCP] 79(a).’”16   
 
Under FRCP 58(a), “[e]very judgment and amended 
judgment must be set out in a separate document.”17  If no 
separate document exists, “an appellant has 180 days to file a 
notice of appeal—150 days for the judgment to be considered 
entered, plus the usual 30 days from the entry of judgment.”18  
There are certain exceptions to FRCP 58, none of which are 
relevant here.  
 
 To determine whether the District Court’s August 10 
Judgment can be properly characterized as a separate 
document, we must consider whether it meets the following 
requirements: “(1) it must be self-contained and separate from 
the opinion, (2) it must note the relief granted, and (3) it must 
omit (or at least substantially omit) the trial court’s reasons for 
disposing of the claims.”19   
 
Here, the August 10 Judgment does not comply with 
FRCP 58’s separate-document rule.  It is neither “self-
contained and separate from the opinion,” nor does it omit its 
reasoning in disposition of the claim.20  We have said that “[t]o 
be independent of the court’s opinion, an order must be 
separately titled and captioned, not paginated consecutively to 
the opinion or memorandum, not stapled or otherwise attached 
 
16 Id. (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii)).  
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). 
18 LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted). 




to the opinion, and must be docketed separately.”21  The 
Judgment, which is ten pages, contains one case caption, the 
trial judge’s signature on the last page of the document, and is 
consecutively paginated.  The judgment portion of the 
document begins on page seven, where it notes the relief 
granted and makes several orders.  Further, although titled and 
docketed as a “Judgment,” and noting the relief granted, the 
document contains the District Court’s factual findings and 
legal discussion disposing of DLJ’s claims.  This precludes the 
August 10 Judgment from complying with FRCP 58’s 
separate-document rule.22  
  
Accordingly, the August 10 Judgment should be 
considered “entered” 150 days after August 10, 2018, on 
January 7, 2019, under FRAP 4(a)(7)(A)(ii).23  Sheridan had 
thirty days after that to file his notice of appeal. 
 
Because Sheridan filed his notice of appeal in October 
2018, well within the additional 180 days, we have jurisdiction 
over this appeal.24 
  
 
21 Id. at 224. 
22 In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 454 F.3d 235, 245 (3d Cir. 
2006) (holding that an order failed to comply with Rule 58’s 
separate order requirement “because it contained an extended 
discussion of facts and procedural history”). 
23 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
24 Although Sheridan filed his notice of appeal before the 
judgment was formally entered, “we are not prevented from 
entertaining it.”  LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 224 n.5 (“Filing Before 
Entry of Judgment.  A notice of appeal filed after the court 





Sheridan’s primary argument is that the District Court 
erred in granting judgment at the close of DLJ’s case-in-chief 
without allowing him to be heard on his evidence and defenses.  
He also challenges (i) the District Court’s finding that DLJ had 
standing to bring this action and enforce the Note and 
Mortgage, (ii) the monetary award granted to DLJ, and argues 
(iii) the judgment is void because the parties did not attempt to 




 At the close of its case-in-chief, DLJ moved for 
judgment based on partial findings.  Sheridan did not object to 
the District Court’s consideration of the motion at that time.  
Instead, the parties proceeded to make their respective 
arguments as to whether DLJ met its burden of providing 
evidence sufficient to establish its debt and foreclosure claims 
and, more generally, whether DLJ had standing to bring this 
action.25  Having failed to successfully challenge DLJ’s 
evidence, Sheridan now claims that the District Court erred in 
granting DLJ’s motion because it deprived him of the 
opportunity to be heard.   
 
judgment of order — is treated as filed on the date of and after 
the entry” (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2))); see also Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(7)(B) (“A failure to set forth a judgment or order 
on a separate document when required by [FRCP] 58(a)(1) 
does not affect the validity of an appeal from that judgment or 
order.”)  
25 We note that Ana Sheridan also moved for “judgment as a 
matter of law.”  App. 288. 
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It gives us pause that the District Court granted 
judgment in favor of DLJ at the close of DLJ’s case-in-chief.  
Indeed, while we have recognized that a district court has wide 
latitude in the management of civil trials, we have also 
observed that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “repeatedly 
embody the principle that trials should be both fair and 
efficient.”26  Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, 
we find relief was appropriate under Rule 52(c). 
 
 Rule 52(c) states: 
 
If a party has been fully heard on 
an issue during a nonjury trial and 
the court finds against the party on 
that issue, the court may enter 
judgment against the party on a 
claim or defense that, under the 
controlling law, can be maintained 
or defeated only with a favorable 
finding on that issue.  The court 
may, however, decline to render 
any judgment until the close of the 
evidence.  A judgment on partial 
findings must be supported by 
findings of fact and conclusions of 
law as required by Rule 52(a).27 
 
We have explained that any party may make a Rule 
52(c) motion, and the court may grant such motion, “at any 
 
26 Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 
604, 609 (3d Cir. 1995). 
27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c). 
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time during a bench trial, so long as the party against whom 
judgment is to be rendered has been ‘fully heard’ with respect 
to an issue essential to that party’s case.”28  But that a party be 
“fully heard” does not mean that a party must be allowed “to 
introduce every shred of evidence that a party wishes, without 
regard to the probative value of that evidence.”29  “As a result, 
the court need not wait until that party rests its case-in-chief to 
enter judgment pursuant to Rule 52(c).”30  “In this respect, it is 
within the discretion of the trial court to enter a judgment on 
partial findings even though a party has represented that it can 
adduce further evidence, if under the circumstances, the court 
determines that the evidence will have little or no probative 
value.”31  In addition, even if the district court believes 
judgment in favor of the moving party would be appropriate, it 
remains within the district court’s discretion to wait until the 
 
28 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Systems, Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 272 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
29 Id. at 272 n.21 (quoting First Va. Banks, Inc. v. BP 
Exploration & Oil, Inc., 206 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2000)).   
30 Id. at 272; see also N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. 
Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 246 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure . . . allow judgment after partial 
findings against a party that has been fully heard on the 
relevant issue.”); Granite State Ins. Co. v. Smart Modular 
Techs., Inc., 76 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he rule 
‘authorizes the court to enter judgment at any time that it can 
appropriately make a dispositive finding of fact on the 
evidence.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) advisory 
committee’s note)). 
31 EBC, 618 F.3d at 272 n.21. 
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non-movant has presented her case or all probative evidence is 
admitted before entering judgment.32   
 
Further, although Rule 52(c) motions are most 
commonly brought by defendants at the close of plaintiff’s 
case-in-chief,33 judgments based on partial findings may be 
entered against both plaintiffs and defendants.34  Indeed, the 
history of Rule 52(c) informs our understanding of the rule.  
Previously, FRCP 41(b) “permitted a court to enter judgment 
against a plaintiff at the close of his or her case-in-chief if he 
or she failed to meet the applicable burden of proof.”35  Rule 
41(b), however, did not permit a district court to enter 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff at the conclusion of its case-
in-chief.  That was the law until 1991, when subdivision (c) 
was added to Rule 52 and replaced some provisions of Rule 
41(b).  The Advisory Committee Notes state, in relevant part: 
“Language is deleted that authorized the use of this rule as a 
means of terminating a non-jury action on the merits when the 
plaintiff has failed to carry a burden of proof in presenting the 
plaintiff’s case.  The device is replaced by the new provisions 
of Rule 52(c), which authorize entry of judgment against the 
defendant as well as the plaintiff, and earlier than the close of 
the case of the party against whom judgment is rendered.”36  
Subdivision (c) therefore “operates more broadly than did its 
 
32 Id. at 272. 
33 9C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & 
Proc. Civ. § 2573.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2020). 
34 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) advisory committee’s note. 
35 EBC, 618 F.3d at 272 n.20 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) 
advisory committee’s note).  




predecessor, because courts may now make partial findings on 
any claim or defense, of any party, at any time.”37  In short, 
Rule 52(c) motions may be granted either for or against the 
plaintiff at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case-in-chief. 
 
What is important is that the trial court may make a 
dispositive finding on an essential factual issue and judgment 
may be entered when the parties have been provided with the 
opportunity to submit relevant and probative evidence bearing 
on that issue.  Courts cannot deprive parties of the opportunity 
to submit relevant and probative evidence on an issue essential 
to a party’s case, unless the complaining party has forfeited the 
right to present certain evidence by virtue of its conduct during 
the litigation.  For example, as relevant here, a party’s failure 
to comply with disclosure obligations under FRCP 26 may 
result in the trial court preventing that party from using certain 
evidence or calling certain witnesses at trial.38  Under this 
scenario, a party against whom judgment has been entered 
under Rule 52(c) cannot complain that she was deprived of the 
opportunity to be heard absent error in the trial court’s decision 
to preclude the party from offering the excluded evidence.  In 
the usual scenario where both parties have properly brought the 
case to trial, judgment based on partial findings may be 
appropriate when both parties have been “fully heard” and the 
court is able to make a dispositive finding based on the 
evidence presented. 
 
 Here, in view of the particular circumstances of this 
case, we find that Roy Sheridan was “fully heard” within the 
 
37 EBC, 618 F.3d at 272 n.20. 
38 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (providing potential sanctions for a 
party’s failure to abide by Rule 26(a) or (e)).  
16 
 
meaning of Rule 52(c).  In order to succeed on its foreclosure 
claim, DLJ was required to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that “(1) the debtor executed a promissory note and 
mortgage, (2) the debtor is in default under the terms of the 
note and mortgage, and (3) the lender is authorized to foreclose 
on the property mortgaged as security for the note.”39  On 
appeal, Sheridan does not contest the first two elements.40  
Rather, he argues that the District Court prevented him from 
offering evidence to challenge DLJ’s standing and authority to 
foreclose, and prevented him from presenting his affirmative 





As to DLJ’s standing to enforce the Note and foreclose, 
DLJ presented the testimony of Linda Holmes, a case manager 
with SPS.  Holmes testified that DLJ is the current holder of 
the Note and is in possession of the original Note.  She also 
testified that FirstBank transferred the Note to DLJ, and DLJ 
introduced an “allonge document”41 at trial to show that it “has 
 
39 Anthony v. FirstBank V.I., 58 V.I. 224, 232 (2013) (quoting 
Thompson v. Fla. Wood Treaters, Inc., 52 V.I. 986, 995 (D.V.I. 
2009)). 
40 It is undisputed that Roy and Ana Sheridan signed the Note 
and that they are in default under the terms of the Note.   
41 An allonge is “[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a 
negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further 
indorsements when the original paper is filled with 
indorsements.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 88 (9th ed. 2009).  
Holmes explained in her testimony that an allonge “giv[es] 
ownership to another party.”  App. 203.  
17 
 
the original note.”42  Through Holmes’s testimony, DLJ also 
introduced the Assignment, which assigned the Mortgage from 
FirstBank to DLJ in 2013.   
 
Sheridan was given the opportunity to contest the 
evidence submitted in support of DLJ’s standing to enforce the 
Note and foreclose on the properties mortgaged as security for 
the Note.  Although terse, his counsel cross-examined Holmes 
on the relevant loan documents, including the Note, allonge, 
and Assignment.  Indeed, Sheridan’s argument that DLJ lacked 
standing was premised on the face of the loan documents, 
which Sheridan had an opportunity to inspect and challenge.43  
Sheridan does not assert that a fuller examination of Holmes 
would have revealed additional evidence and we will not 
second-guess counsel’s tactical decision to limit her cross-
examination. 
 
In addition, Sheridan also testified, and thus had an 
opportunity to disclose evidence of which he had personal 
knowledge.  At oral argument, Sheridan suggested that because 
he was called to testify during DLJ’s case-in-chief, his counsel 
could not have cross-examined him beyond the scope of issues 
raised during direct examination.  However, to the extent his 
testimony would have related to DLJ’s standing, or rebutted 
Holmes’s testimony, those issues would properly have been 
elicited during cross-examination.  And, to the extent he sought 
to testify as to matters beyond the scope of cross-examination, 
he could have asked the District Court to exercise its discretion 
 
42 App. 217. 
43 Indeed, Sheridan conceded at oral argument that we can rule 
on the issue concerning the allonge documents presented by 
DLJ on the record before us.   
18 
 
to permit such testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 
611(b).44  Sheridan did neither.  Further, although he was quite 
possibly unaware that the District Court would render 
judgment at the conclusion of DLJ’s case-in-chief, Sheridan 
did not ask the District Court for permission to testify again at 
any time prior to the District Court ruling in favor of DLJ. 
 
Sheridan also engaged in an extensive colloquy with the 
District Court as to DLJ’s standing to foreclose, including 
whether the Assignment was defective and whether DLJ held 
only a partial interest in the Assignment.  The District Court 
allowed all parties to present their arguments before deciding 
the issue of DLJ’s standing and authority to foreclose.  
Sheridan did not, at that time, indicate what further evidence, 
including any rebuttal evidence, he had to contest DLJ’s 
standing.  Upon hearing that the parties had nothing further to 
present on the issue of standing, the District Court properly 
exercised its discretion in granting judgment in favor of DLJ.45   
 
Critically, besides recalling Sheridan to the stand, there 
appears to have been no evidence for Sheridan to present.  
Because Sheridan failed to participate during discovery, the 
 
44 Fed. R. Evid. 611(b) (“Cross-examination should not go 
beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters 
affecting the witness’s credibility.  The court may allow 
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.”). 
45 At the conclusion of the proceedings, the District Court 
asked the parties whether there was “[a]nything else . . . to 
address[.]”  App. 313.  Sheridan mentioned only his legal 
challenge to the Assignment and ability to raise his defense of 
fraud, which, as discussed infra, the District Court was within 
its discretionary power to deny.   
19 
 
Magistrate Judge denied Sheridan’s untimely non-party 
subpoena to compel testimony from a FirstBank employee and 
ordered that “documents and witnesses not previously 
disclosed [by the Sheridans], with the exception of the 
Sheridans themselves, be excluded from trial.”46  Thus, 
Sheridan could have only challenged the validity of the loan 
documents, including the Note, allonges, and Assignment 
through cross-examination of Holmes, which he was given the 
opportunity to do, or through his own testimony, to the extent 
he had any personal knowledge.  To date, Sheridan has not 
indicated what additional admissible evidence he intended to 
present to contest DLJ’s standing.47   
 
The District Court heard and considered Sheridan’s 
arguments concerning the transfer of the Note from FirstBank 
to DLJ and the validity of the Assignment.  Accordingly, we 





Sheridan also argues he was not fully heard because the 
District Court prevented him from presenting evidence 
supporting his affirmative defenses of fraud and illegality 
under the Truth in Lending Act.  Again, we disagree. 
 
Sheridan moved to amend his answer to assert defenses 
of fraud and illegality the day before trial was scheduled to 
 
46 App. 417.  Sheridan does not challenge this ruling on appeal. 
47 Indeed, at oral argument, Sheridan conceded that, at the time 
of trial, there was no further witness he intended to call to 
challenge DLJ’s standing to enforce the Note.   
20 
 
begin.  The District Court did not explicitly rule on the motion 
prior to judgment.  However, in its written Judgment, the 
District Court denied all pending motions as moot.  We 
construe the District Court’s decision to proceed to judgment 
at the conclusion of the bench trial as an implicit denial of the 
motion for leave to amend.48  Thus, Sheridan’s argument that 
he was deprived of the opportunity to be heard with regard to 
his affirmative defenses of fraud and illegality is viable only if 
he can show that the District Court abused its discretion in 
failing to grant his motion for leave to amend his answer. 
 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to 
amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” and we 
have consistently adopted a liberal approach to the allowance 
of amendments.49  Even when a party is late in moving for 
leave to amend, we have expressed a preference for allowance 
of the amendment, so long as the opposing party is not 
 
48 See United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 711 n.10 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (construing the court’s decision to proceed to final 
judgment as an implicit denial of the defendant’s motion for a 
new trial); see also United States v. Depew, 210 F.3d 1061, 
1065 (9th Cir. 2000)  (“We treat the district court’s failure to 
rule on [the defendant’s] motion as a denial of it.”); Norman v. 
Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The denial 
of a motion by the district court, although not formally 
expressed, may be implied by the entry of a final judgment or 
of an order inconsistent with the granting of the relief sought 
by the motion.”).  
49 Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. M.V. Hakusan II, 954 F.2d 874, 
886–87 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). 
21 
 
prejudiced by the delay.50  “It is well-settled that prejudice to 
the nonmoving party is the touchstone for the denial of an 
amendment.”51  And we review the denial of leave to amend 
for abuse of discretion.52 
 
Here, Sheridan’s motion was untimely, and the late 
assertion of fraud would have prejudiced DLJ.  Sheridan’s 
original answer asserted boilerplate affirmative defenses, none 
of which contained any allegations of fraud or violations of the 
Truth in Lending Act.  Under the District Court’s Trial 
Management Order, the parties were given until January 2017 
to amend their pleadings.  Of course, Sheridan failed to amend 
by this date.  And he does not explain his failure to do so.53  
Instead, he waited over one year from when the complaint was 
filed and several months after the completion of discovery to 
 
50 See Charpentier v. Godsil, 937 F.2d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“Unless the opposing party will be prejudiced, leave to amend 
should generally be allowed.”). 
51 Cornell & Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978).   
52 Berkshire Fashions, 954 F.2d at 886. 
53 In addition to satisfying the Rule 15(a) standard, Sheridan 
was also required to demonstrate good cause under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) to amend his answer after the 
deadline set in the Trial Management Order.  See Premier 
Comp Solutions, LLC v. UPMC, 970 F.3d 316, 317 (3d. Cir. 
2020) (clarifying that “when a party moves to amend or add a 
party after the deadline in a district court’s scheduling order 
has passed, the ‘good cause’ standard of Rule 16(b)(4) . . . 
applies” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)).  Sheridan’s failure 
to address the required showing of good cause further supports 
the District Court’s denial of the motion for leave to amend.   
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move for leave to amend.54  Even if Sheridan could not have 
asserted his defenses of fraud when he filed his original 
answer, he could have exercised due diligence and moved for 
leave to amend soon after discovery was complete.  His 
proposed amended answer was based on discovery DLJ 
provided, which shows that Sheridan had knowledge of his 
defenses months before trial. 
   
Further, because DLJ did not have notice of Sheridan’s 
defenses, the untimely defense would likely have required 
additional discovery.  Sheridan’s defense of fraud relates to the 
conduct of FirstBank employees who were not a party to this 
action, and the origination of the loan documents.  DLJ’s 
theory in this case presumed the validity of the original loan 
documents; thus, amendment of the answer would have 
required DLJ to engage in a last-minute change in strategy.55  
Further, because Sheridan did not assert allegations of fraud in 
his original answer, nor did he participate in discovery, no 
discovery was exchanged with regard to the conduct of 
 
54 Sheridan also argues that the District Court was on notice of 
his defenses of fraud and violations of the Truth in Lending Act 
because the defenses were raised in his opposition to DLJ’s 
motion for summary judgment.  However, even this opposition 
was untimely as it was filed several months after DLJ’s motion 
for summary judgment, which was filed in February 2018, 
without leave from the District Court, and only ten days before 
trial.   
55 We also note that Sheridan’s proposed amended answer 
contains no factual allegations as to the fraudulent conduct 
FirstBank employees engaged in.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“In 
alleging fraud . . . , a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”). 
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FirstBank employees in issuing the original loan and 
subsequent modifications.  The lack of discovery as to the 
conduct of FirstBank employees in issuing the original loan 
documents is presumably why Sheridan served an untimely 
subpoena on a FirstBank employee.56  
 
And, as explained above, in view of the Magistrate 
Judge’s order excluding witnesses and evidence not previously 
disclosed, Sheridan had nothing to present besides his own 
testimony to support his purported affirmative defenses.57  We 
can hardly fault the District Court for implicitly denying the 
motion, especially where Sheridan failed to participate in 
discovery and only moved to amend his answer the night 




We would be remiss if we failed to caution against the 
practice of granting judgment for the plaintiff before the 
 
56 Notably, in May 2018, Ana Sheridan sought to reopen 
discovery and obtain “a full copy of the entire loan file, 
including, but not limited to, any document relating to First 
Bank’s (Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest) evaluation, 
approval, and administration of the loan.”  App. 361.  In June 
2018, the District Court denied the motion.   
57 Presumably in support of his defenses, on June 12, 2018, 
Sheridan served Patrickson Thomas, a FirstBank employee, 
with a non-party subpoena seeking to compel his testimony at 
trial.  Both non-party FirstBank and DLJ moved to quash the 
subpoena.  In view of the Magistrate Judge’s order excluding 
evidence and witnesses not previously disclosed, Thomas was 
not allowed to testify at trial. 
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defendant has presented a case.  But such relief was appropriate 
under the circumstances of this case.  Sheridan’s inability to 
present evidence, besides his own testimony, was of his own 
making.  He had full recourse to the federal rules of discovery, 
but failed to comply with his discovery obligations.  He also 
had ample opportunity to seek leave to amend his answer, and 
the District Court acted within its discretion in refusing to 
allow the untimely amendment.  Further, Sheridan was allowed 
to testify, and the record suggests there was no further 
admissible evidence he intended to present on the relevant and 
essential issues. 
      
Accordingly, we find that Sheridan was fully heard 
within the meaning of Rule 52(c) and that this record is ripe for 




Having determined that Sheridan was fully heard prior 
to judgment, we proceed to the merits of his arguments.  
Sheridan’s arguments amount to the following challenges: (1) 
 
58 Sheridan raises a procedural due process claim under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, as applied to the Virgin Islands by the Revised 
Organic Act of 1954.  He claims that he was deprived of 
property without due process of law because he was denied the 
right to be heard at trial.  However, Sheridan concedes that 
Rule 52(c)’s requirement that a party be “fully heard” is 
consistent with the federal constitution’s due process 
protections.  Because we find that Sheridan was “fully heard” 




the District Court erred in finding that DLJ had standing to 
foreclose on the properties and that, because DLJ lacked 
standing, the District Court did not have jurisdiction over this 
action; (2) DLJ failed to join indispensable parties; (3) DLJ 
was awarded more than it was due under the Note; and (4) 
judgment was not proper because the parties did not attempt to 
mediate in good faith.  None of these arguments prevail. 
 
“In considering whether to grant judgment under Rule 
52(c), the district court applies the same standard of proof and 
weighs the evidence as it would at the conclusion of the trial.”59  
“[T]he [district] court does not view the evidence through a 
particular lens or draw inferences favorable to either party,” 
and can appropriately make credibility determinations when 
necessary.60  The district court “must make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a).”61  We review those 
factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.62  
We will find clear error if we are “left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”63  And 
“[w]e will not reverse ‘[i]f the district court’s account of the 
evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its 





59 EBC, 618 F.3d at 272. 
60 Id. at 272-73. 
61 Id. at 273. 
62 Id.   
63 Id. 
64 Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 




Sheridan argues that DLJ lacks standing to enforce the 
Note and Mortgage because (1) the Assignment transferred 
only a partial interest in the Note and Mortgage to DLJ and (2) 
the defective chain of Assignments makes it unclear what 
interest DLJ possesses in the Note.  We disagree. 
 
Although we would nevertheless reject Sheridan’s 
challenge to the Assignment,65 we note that because the Note 
 
65 Sheridan primarily challenges the Assignment on the basis 
that, because it omitted Ana Sheridan’s name, FirstBank must 
have meant to transfer only a partial interest to DLJ.  Sheridan 
also implied that the Assignment was invalid because it failed 
to acknowledge the mortgage modifications.  Assuming 
Sheridan has standing to challenge the Assignment, despite not 
being a party to the Assignment, the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Assignment, and its determination that 
FirstBank transferred its entire interest in the Mortgage to DLJ, 
was not clearly erroneous.  A mortgage or an assignment of 
mortgage is a contract, see Aviation Assocs. v. V.I. Port Auth., 
26 V.I. 24, 34-35 (1990) (providing that an assignment “is a 
matter of contract”), and we “review a district court’s 
interpretation of a contract for clear error,” In re Nat’l Football 
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 962 F.3d 94, 101 (3d 
Cir. 2020).  The language of the Assignment unambiguously 
transfers FirstBank’s interests in the Mortgage to DLJ.  See 
White v. Spenceley Realty, LLC, 53 V.I. 666, 678 (2010) 
(looking first at the contract’s language to determine the 
existence of any ambiguity).  The Assignment indicates Roy 
Sheridan’s name as a borrower, the date the mortgage was 
executed, that the mortgage was executed in favor of First 
Bank, the two properties subject to foreclosure, the original 
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was transferred to DLJ, under the Restatement (Third) of 
Property, and absent Virgin Islands law to the contrary, the 
Mortgage in this case automatically followed the Note.66  
 
In challenging DLJ’s standing to enforce the Note, 
Sheridan does not contest DLJ’s possession of the Note, rather, 
he argues that the evidence “reveals various unreconciled, 
partial [a]ssignments” of the Note and Mortgage which make 
it “unclear” what interest DLJ possesses.67 
 
The debt in this action is evidenced by the Note.  There 
has been no suggestion that a note secured by a mortgage is not 
a negotiable instrument under the Virgin Islands Uniform 
Commercial Code.   
 
Under Virgin Islands law, and in conformity with the 
Uniform Commercial Code, persons entitled to enforce a 
negotiable instrument are the “(i) the holder of the instrument, 
 
principal amount of the loan, and the document number 
assigned to the Mortgage when it was recorded.  These 
descriptions and recording information identified the mortgage 
being assigned.  Sheridan provides no legal authority for the 
proposition that omitting a co-borrower’s name from an 
assignment necessarily means that the assignor intends to 
transfer only a partial interest.   
66 See UMLIC VP LLC v. Matthias, 234 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523 
(D.V.I. 2002) (“[I]n the Virgin Islands, no separate document 
specifically assigning and transferring the mortgage which 
secures a note is required to accompany the assignment of the 
obligation, because the mortgage automatically follows the 
note.”). 
67 Sheridan Br. 26-27.  
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(ii) a non-holder in possession of the instrument who has the 
rights of a holder; or (iii) a person not in possession of the 
instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant 
to Section 3-309 or 3-418(d).”68  
 
As relevant here, a “[h]older” is defined as “the person 
in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either 
to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in 
possession[.]”69  “Negotiation” is required to make another 
party a holder.70  “[I]f an instrument is payable to an identified 
person, negotiation requires transfer of possession of the 
instrument and its indorsement by the holder.”71  
  
Here, the Note is payable to FirstBank.  Therefore, to 
show that it is a “holder” with standing to enforce the Note, 
DLJ was required to prove that FirstBank transferred 
possession of the Note and indorsed the Note to DLJ.  Holmes, 
whose testimony the District Court assigned “great weight,”72 
testified that FirstBank indorsed the Note to DLJ and that DLJ 
is in possession of the Note.  Further, copies of the original 
Note, the 2009 amendment to the Note, and allonge endorsing 
the Note to DLJ were produced at trial.  The allonge, dated June 
20, 2013, includes the loan number, borrowers’ names, loan 
amount, is signed by an employee of FirstBank, and states: 
“Pay to the Order of: DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. Without 
Recourse FirstBank of Puerto Rico.”73  Holmes testified that 
 
68 See 11A V.I.C. § 3–301. 
69 See id. § 1–201(b)(20)(A). 
70 Id. § 3–201(a). 
71 Id. § 3–201(b).   
72 App. 313. 
73 App. 498 (emphasis omitted).  
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this allonge was attached to the Note when DLJ received the 
2009 amendment to the Note.  Accordingly, as the District 
Court found, this allonge and Holmes’s testimony evidences 
DLJ’s indorsement of the Note to DLJ.74  
  
From this evidence, the District Court properly found 
that the Note was transferred to DLJ, that DLJ is in possession 
of the Note, and that DLJ has standing and is authorized to 
enforce the Note.   
 
Sheridan attempts to cast doubt on DLJ’s interest in the 
Note by pointing to a single page which contains only a stamp 
stating “Pay to the order of: [Blank].  Without Recourse 
Federal Home Loan Bank of N.Y.” and signed by “Paul D. 
Gourleux, SVP.”75  There is no other writing on this page.  This 
single page is part of an exhibit introduced at trial which 
contains the 2009 amendment to the Note, one allonge 
indorsing the Note to blank, and the allonge described above, 
which indorsed the Note to DLJ.  Holmes testified that the 
stamp was “on the back of the original copies” of the 2009 
amendment to the Note when DLJ received the loan 
documents.76  There was no further testimony or evidence 
introduced as to the relevance of the stamp.  Nor was there any 
testimony or evidence suggesting that “Federal Home Loan 
Bank of N.Y.” is an entity with interest in the Note and 
 
74 The District Court stated: “And there has been some 
suggestion that while the allonge itself isn’t an assignment, I 
don’t believe there is any reasonable doubt or any doubt, really, 
that the allonge is an endorsement of the thing that precedes it, 
which is the note.”  App. 312. 
75 App. 496 (emphasis omitted). 
76 App. 250. 
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Mortgage.  DLJ’s possession of the Note and FirstBank’s 
indorsement, notwithstanding the unsubstantiated challenge to 
the chain of assignments, provided DLJ with standing to 
enforce the Note. 
 
In view of Holmes’s testimony, DLJ’s physical 
possession of the Note, the allonge endorsing the Note to DLJ, 
the Assignment, and the lack of evidence to the contrary, we 
find no clear error in the District Court’s finding that the Note 
and Mortgage were assigned to DLJ and that therefore DLJ is 
entitled to collect all sums due under the Note and foreclose on 
the properties mortgaged as security for the Note.77 
 
We have carefully considered the remaining issues 
presented by Sheridan and conclude they are without merit. 
 
* * * 
 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the Judgment of 
the District Court.  
 
77 Because we agree that DLJ has standing to enforce the Note 
and Mortgage, we reject Sheridan’s argument that DLJ is not 
the “real party in interest” within the meaning of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 17(a) and that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction over this action. 
